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originS oF THE CUrrEnT CriSES 
Europe is in the midst of a series of interlinked crises. These have their 
roots in the build up of structural divergences and macroeconomic imba-
lances between in particular Eurozone states. Important steps have been 
taken to strengthen economic and fiscal governance, in order to put the 
European economy on a more sustainable basis in the longer term. Howe-
ver, short-term economic stimulus is needed; otherwise the burden of 
austerity and structural adjustment will not be socially sustainable. At the 
same time, reforms need to consider long-term challenges, in particular 
resource pressures and climate change.
BriDging SHorT- AnD Long-TErM CHALLEngES
The shift towards a green economy can bridge these two timeframes. 
Long-term challenges are already emerging. Resource prices have rea-
ched record levels, unseen since 1900. Price correlations between and 
within resource groups are stronger than ever, and create systemic 
risks for the global economy. The dramatic pre-crisis rise in commodity 
prices, particularly oil, played a role in fuelling and triggering the crises. 
Resource and environmental constraints are thus already a challenge and 
an opportunity.
grEEn inVESTMEnTS ToWArDS rESiLiEnCE AnD proSpEriTY
The shift to a green economy is vital to guarantee long-term resilience and 
resource security in Europe. It will reduce Member States’ vulnerability to 
future oil prices, alleviating the oil price drag on the EU economy by 0.7% 
of GDP by 2020 already. By 2030, investments in resource efficiency can 
save the EU 3% of its GDP per annum. In the short-term, measures such as 
environmental fiscal reform and green investments can create investment 
in jobs and growth, particularly in troubled Peripheral countries. Euro-
pean coordination on these measures is vital. 
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table 1. Synergies and conditions between the green economy and the crisis response 
In the table below, we outline the policy priorities in the current crisis context, and the potential synergies and conditions 
between them and green economy reforms. 
Environmental tax reform investing in the green economy supporting innovation
Fiscal 
consolidation
Outcome: can yield additional state revenues. 
Condition: depends on the recycling option 
chosena
Outcome: Will likely require some short run 
budgetary outlay, but private sector can 
contribute significantly. Demand stimulation 
and job creation create additional revenues 
in the medium run. 
Condition: depends on capacity to mutualise 
sustainable investments (i.e. green bonds). 
Depends on the policy design and size of the 
multiplier effectb 
Outcome: will likely require some 
budget outlay, but policy design 
can attract the private sector 
Job creation Outcome: can create jobs via payroll tax 
reduction
Condition: depends on reductions in payroll 
taxes and labour market characteristicsa
Outcome: can stimulate high and low skilled 
employment in currently labour intensive 
sectors. 
Condition: see aboveb
Outcome: no positive effect in 
the short term. 
Reducing 
inequalities
Outcome: can reduce inequalities via 
increased employment, potentially in low skill, 
low wage sectors. Can increase progressivity. 
Condition: progressivity depends on 
incorporation within broader tax reform 
Outcome: green investment programs 
can target job creation among and social 
improvements in vulnerable population 
segments, such as reduction in energy bills 
and creation of public transport.   
Condition: depends on the skill profile of 
employment created, and the ability to 
generate social benefits, such as energy 
security. 
Outcome: depends on the white/
blue content of green jobs and 
trade regulatory framework
Reducing intra-
EU-Eurozone 
imbalances
Outcome: Could form part of a coordinated 
strategy to increase relative cost 
competitiveness in Peripheral countries, by 
reducing labour taxation. Revenues could 
contribute to transfers to Peripheral countries. 
Condition: depends on integration within 
a broader strategy to address European 
imbalances 
Outcome: potential for inward investment 
and the creation of new export sectors (e.g. 
clean energy) in Peripheral countries.  
Condition: depends on the design, content, 
target of investment programs
Outcome: technological catch 
up and increased collaboration 
on and diffusion of frontier 
innovation could reduce 
economic imbalances.
Condition: depends on the 
design, content, target of 
innovation programs.  
Competitiveness Outcome: Can increase innovation and 
competitiveness of green sectors. Can reduce 
exposure to fossil fuel price fluctuations. Can 
reduce the competitiveness of a small number 
of industries. 
Condition: ETR alone is insufficient. A positive 
outcome depends on a broader policy package 
and industrial strategy to promote green 
sectors and facilitate the adaptation of 
exposed sectors.  
Outcome: potential for increased 
competitiveness via increased resource 
productivity and lesser exposure to resource 
price shocks
Outcome: large potential 
for increased non-price 
competitiveness, particularly in 
green sectors. Lower exposure to 
resource price shocks. 
Condition: depends on a 
broader policy package and 
industrial strategy to promote 
green sectors and facilitate the 
adaptation of exposed sectors.
Increased economic 
resilience
Outcome: can reduce exposure to resource 
price volatility and increases, by price 
variance and inducing structural and 
behavioural changes. 
Condition: depends on level of the tax 
rate and its evolution over time, and 
complementary policies to induce efficiency 
and innovation. 
Outcome: can contribute to large-scale 
development of sustainable infrastructures 
and reduced exposure to resource price 
shocks
Outcome: depends on actual level of green 
investment 
Outcome: innovation enables 
faster rate of transition. 
Lower exposure to resource 
price shocks, and increased 
productivity of clean 
technologies.  
Conditions: depends on ability to 
direct technical change 
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EXEcutiVE summarY
SSome Peripheral countries of the Eurozone - 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain - are in the 
midst of unprecedented crises. Given the level of 
integration within the EU, this is now a European 
crisis. It still threatens the existence of the Euro-
zone and the European project. A shift towards a 
green economy can contribute to setting the Euro-
pean economy on the right path. 
The current situation has a number of causes. 
Massive private debt booms built up in a number 
of Peripheral countries. When these countries 
joined the Eurozone they experience a “positive 
confidence shock”, based on the perceived remov-
al of sovereign debt risks and strong future growth 
perspectives. The “positive confidence shock” is 
evident in the negative real interest rates experi-
enced by some Peripheral countries since 2000. 
It encouraged excessive borrowing, inward capi-
tal flows and the build up of asset bubbles. When 
the global financial crisis hit, external capital was 
withdrawn, bubbles burst, and government fiscal 
positions worsened dramatically. In the case of 
Greece, government indebtedness was also exces-
sive before the crisis.         
The crisis revealed that the growth model for 
Peripheral countries was to a large extent unsus-
tainable. Financial and asset bubbles, and public 
indebtedness in the case of Greece, hid growing 
structural divergences between Eurozone coun-
tries. These are evident in the current account 
imbalance of more than 10% of GDP between the 
Peripheral countries and Germany. The crisis also 
revealed the incompleteness of the Eurozone. Pe-
ripheral countries cannot devalue their currencies 
to reduce the debt burden and increase external 
competitiveness. Fiscal transfers or labour market 
mobility are also more limited than in other cur-
rency zones, such as the USA.  
So far the EU and the Eurozone have, at least 
temporarily, managed to contain the crisis. Steps 
have been taken to improve fiscal discipline, eco-
nomic coordination and surveillance. Structural 
reforms are being undertaken to rebalance eco-
nomic growth in Peripheral countries. But these 
will take time to bear fruit, and are missing two 
key elements: 
Firstly, short-term measures to stimulate invest-
ment in jobs and growth across Europe, in par-
ticular in Peripheral countries. Without stimulus 
measures, the structural adjustments in Peripheral 
countries threatens to be socially unsustainable. A 
stimulus program should be focused on increasing 
the structural resilience of Peripheral economies, 
while also creating short-term jobs and growth.  
However, the crisis response must also address 
the defining challenges of tomorrow. Among 
these, two interlinked challenges stand out as es-
pecially important: the growing pressure on natu-
ral resources, and climate change. 
These long-term challenges are already emerg-
ing. Real resource prices have reached record 
levels, unseen since 1900 (McKinsey, 2011). Price 
correlations between and within resource groups 
are stronger than ever, and create systemic risks 
for the global economy. These trends will contin-
ue. Highly productive resources have been tapped: 
increasing production is growing more costly in 
monetary, resource and environmental terms. Yet 
by 2030 the world will have to find 45% more en-
ergy than today, 50% more food, 40% more water, 
80% more steel, as the developing world grows at 
a rate and scale without historic precedent. 
The dramatic pre-crisis rise in commodity prices, 
particularly oil, played a role in fuelling and trig-
gering the crisis. In Europe, Member States’ vul-
nerability to the oil price rise was unequal. This 
exacerbated the structural divergences and mac-
roeconomic imbalances that destabilized the Eu-
rozone. In the USA, an explosion in global “petro-
dollars” contributed to the glut of cheap credit that 
fuelled the subprime boom, becoming the largest 
global source of capital outflows in 2006. When 
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oil prices continued to increase, interest rates rose 
fivefold in response; average household expendi-
tures on mortgage repayments rose 33% between 
2004 and 2007. Likewise, average household gaso-
line expenditure rose 120% between 2002-2008. 
Household budgets were cut, increasing the rate 
of mortgage defaults, and reducing aggregate de-
mand. The US slid into a mutually aggravating cy-
cle of recession and mortgage defaults, until the 
bubble burst in August 2008. 
Resource and environmental constraints are 
thus already a challenge and an opportunity. Eu-
rope has the world’s highest per capita imports of 
resources, and is now faced with a crisis demand-
ing profound and long-term reforms. This chance 
should be seized to exit the crisis in the right direc-
tion, towards a sustainable and shared prosperity. 
Green economy reforms can have clear synergies 
with the crisis response.
The crisis weakened fiscal position of Member 
States. Many European Countries have pursued 
discretionary fiscal reforms, by increasing taxes 
and reducing government expenditures. These 
measures hamper growth in the short-term; they 
do not address long-term challenges, and they can 
have negative social consequences. Environmental 
fiscal reform (ETR) can contribute to a sustain-
able and fairer fiscal consolidation. Carbon and 
energy taxation can be a growth-friendlier way of 
raising net revenues than taxes on other produc-
tion factors or economic rents (Vivid Economics, 
forthcoming). 
Environmental taxes also offer the possibility 
to transfer taxation from desirable activities like 
employment towards environmentally damaging 
activities. Combined with broader tax reforms, 
environmental taxes have the potential to reduce 
EU unemployment by 2.2 percentage points by 
2020 (Ekins, 2012), induce innovation and re-
source efficiency, and enhance the progressivity 
of the tax system. In Peripheral countries, were 
the black market labour share is high, such a tax-
ation shift can create incentives to join the offi-
cial workforce. For example, a labour-carbon tax 
shift could improve employment by 3.3% in Spain 
(Markandya, 2012). In addition, reduction in la-
bour taxes could contribute to lowering unit la-
bour costs while preserving net wages, and hence 
to a recovery of relative competitiveness in cer-
tain Eurozone countries. Environmental taxation 
can therefore be a logical part of fiscal consoli-
dation, job creation and economic rebalancing in 
the Eurozone. 
Europe also needs cross border investments to 
smooth the necessary structural reforms and de-
leveraging in Peripheral countries. Investments 
in European sustainable energy and resource-
efficient infrastructures can create employment 
and stimulate demand in the short-term. Green 
sectors are particularly attractive as they create 
more jobs than brown sectors, in the short-term. 
In a situation of high, non-equilibrium unemploy-
ment, public investments can create additional net 
jobs and economic activity (Rendahl, 2012). But 
they also enable long-term macroeconomic gains 
thanks to a reduction in the energy bill, to which 
Peripheral countries are particularly exposed, and 
induced improvements in long-term productivity. 
A joint strategy to reinvest in Europe’s productive 
assets, particularly in Peripheral countries, should 
focus on the green sector, and leverage European 
funds. Such green investments are a necessary 
complement to Eurozone structural reforms, as 
in the current environmental they can create jobs 
and growth, and longer-term productivity gains.   
European countries cannot compete on price with 
emerging countries without threatening social co-
hesion. Innovation in green technologies and ideas 
offers the opportunity to enhance competitiveness 
by focusing on potentially high-productivity, emerg-
ing technologies. This is even more important as 
Europe’s trade partners are increasingly investing 
and innovating in green products and services. The 
experience of some EU Member States shows that 
environmental regulation and innovation can in-
crease export competitiveness in green sectors, and 
potentially more broadly across the economy in the 
longer term. A recent econometric study of export 
performance in the EU by Costantinia and Mazzanti 
finds (2012), for example, that “…[o]verall, the ef-
fect of environmental taxes does not conflict with 
export performances, while in some cases they give 
a large impulse to export dynamics”.  
The shift towards a green economy is vital to 
guarantee long-term resilience and resource se-
curity in Europe. It can reduce Member States’ 
vulnerability to future oil prices, alleviating the 
oil price drag on the EU economy by 0.7% of GDP 
by 2020 already. By 2030, investments in resource 
efficiency can save the EU costs equivalent to 3% 
of its GDP per annum. The reduction in exposure 
to price rises and volatility can reduce investment 
uncertainty and improve the EU’s current account. 
Reduction of fossil fuel use and GHG emissions are 
also necessary to limit risks associated to climate 
change, such as extreme events. 
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iNtroductioN
“What is the way forward?” This paper tackles a 
question posed by many European leaders and 
citizens. Tensions in sovereign bond markets have 
eased somewhat since early 2012 and the risk of 
a breakup of the Eurozone has receded. But the 
crises are not over. Bond markets remain tense; 
the public and private sectors have a long way to 
go with deleveraging, and the way out of the crises 
will be long for the real economy. 
However, compared to January 2012, the current 
situation allows us to step back somewhat from 
short-term concerns and pose elements for a long-
er-term reflection. This is precisely the objective of 
our study, whose aim is to bridge the gap between 
two time horizons, which have regrettably been 
considered separately up to now.
We argue that short- and long-term concerns 
can be combined through a shift towards a sustain-
able European economy. In order to do so, we first 
retrace the interlinkages between resource prices 
and the subprime crisis (the external shock which 
revealed systemic weaknesses in the Eurozone). 
Secondly, we examine the contribution of resource 
prices in these structural divergences and macro-
economic imbalances in the Eurozone. By doing 
so we show that resource issues contributed and 
amplified the extent of the economic crises, with-
out being the ultimate cause. We then present the 
rationale for a shift towards a sustainable and fair 
European macro-economy. This shift can be initi-
ated through three types of instruments: invest-
ments, taxation and innovation policy. We address 
these instruments in the final section.
1. uNdErstaNdiNG thE crisEs: 
assEssiNG thEir root causEs
1.1. Main causes of the crises
In this section we briefly outline the causes and 
evolution of the current European crises. In the 
subsequent Section 1.2., we assess the potential 
role of resource constraints in contributing to the 
crises, firstly the US subprime mortgage crisis, 
and secondly the European crises. The intention 
of Section 1.2. is to “zoom in” on this particular 
sub-cause under-discussed in the literature - 
not to posit that resource constraints alone led 
to the crises.   
The 2008/2009 global financial crisis began with 
an economic downturn emerging in 2007/2008 in 
the USA, leading to an accelerating meltdown in 
the US subprime mortgage market. The collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008 froze global 
credit markets and plunged much of the world 
into recession. As a result of the credit crunch and 
ensuing economic downturn, European countries 
saw a drop in fiscal revenues and an increase in 
expenditures, undertaken in order to strengthen 
social safety nets and stimulate growth. Particular-
ly in the Peripheral countries,1 public sector debt 
increased dramatically. 
However, attributing the current EU debt crises 
solely to the “external” shock of the 2008/2009 fi-
nancial crisis would miss the expansionary fiscal 
1. i.e. Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy.
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policy that some Peripheral countries, Greece in 
particular, undertook in the boom years. In a num-
ber of Peripheral countries windfall revenues from 
private, debt-funded asset bubbles masked expan-
sionary fiscal policy, as cyclical budget positions 
were interpreted as structural (Hautpmeier et al, 
2010). When these bubbles burst on the back of 
the global financial crisis, growth slumped, private 
sector deleveraging set in, and governments’ fiscal 
positions worsened.
Pre-crises private debt and asset booms in 
Peripheral countries can be attributed to both 
structural and institutional factors. The competi-
tiveness of Peripheral countries had decreased 
compared to the Northern Eurozone countries, 
due in part to rapid growth in unit labour costs 
in Peripheral countries and the stagnation of real 
median income in Germany. But thanks to large 
capital inflows, including a large share of external 
debt, Peripheral countries were able to grow dur-
ing the boom years, despite this loss of competi-
tiveness. Based on expectations of future high eco-
nomic growth, external investors sought higher 
rates of return on capital in Peripheral countries, 
while the private sector took on high levels of debt. 
Enormous amounts of capital flowed “downhill” to 
regions where growth prospects appeared strong, 
allowing domestic consumers to increase credit-
based consumption.
However, the introduction of the Euro also con-
tributed to these imbalances (Berger and Nitsch, 
2010). When the Peripheral countries joined the 
Euro they experienced a “positive confidence 
shock”, as investors believed that European in-
stitutions such as the Stability and Growth Pact 
would ensure macro-prudential governance, and 
the risk of currency devaluation was removed. 
Interest rates fell from their pre-Euro levels, and 
even converged to those of core countries such as 
Germany. 
The Euro also eliminated nominal exchange rate 
rebalancing. Real exchange rate divergence was 
therefore fully reflected in inflation differentials 
between Eurozone countries.2 In the context of a 
single monetary policy, this led to pro-cyclical dis-
tortions of short-term real interest rates. That is, 
lower income Peripheral countries experienced 
strong growth; real wages and inflation rose, and 
real interest rates fell,3 providing further incen-
tives for borrowing and investment. The perceived 
removal of risk and monetary policy distortions 
that came with Eurozone membership steep-
ened the “downhill” flow of capital into Periph-
eral countries. Huge asymmetric current account 
and private debt positions are evidence of these 
structural divergences and macroeconomic imbal-
ances in the Eurozone (figure 1). Thus growth in 
Peripheral countries was largely based on un-
sustainable capital inflows, which masked in-
creasing losses of competitiveness and growing 
systemic risks. 
The perspectives for growth in the Peripheral 
countries, and in the wider EU are now low. The 
IMF projects growth for the Peripherals to aver-
age 1.1% over the next 3 years, and 1.6% over the 
next 5; for the rest of the EMU it’s 2.3% and 2.3% 
respectively. Growth perspectives are in part so 
poor because of the reduced flexibility associated 
with Eurozone membership: nominal deprecia-
tion is not an option to increase external competi-
tiveness. Nor is, currently, debt mutualisation to 
reduce interest rates and sovereign debt burdens 
in Peripheral countries. There are also supply-side 
factors, as households, business and governments 
still have a long way to go with deleveraging (McK-
insey, 2012). Banks are not lending, and businesses 
2. Cumulated CPI inflation differentials relative to 
Germany were as high as 21% for Greece, 16% for Spain, 
14% for Ireland, 12% for Portugal, and 8% for Italy. 
3. Real interest rate = nominal interest rate – inflation
Figure 1. Current account deficit (left) and net financial assets (right) in selected European regions
Source: Eurostat 
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and households are not investing or consuming. 
Most European governments have little or no 
room for fiscal manoeuvre to offset the slump in 
private demand, and austerity measures will de-
press growth in the short-term (Guajardo et al, 
2011). Yet growth is seen as essential to assist with 
deleveraging, support the European social model, 
and attract future investments (Darvas and Pisani-
Ferry, 2011).
In response, European policy makers are follow-
ing a three-pronged strategy. Firstly, fiscal auster-
ity and structural reforms aim, in the longer-term, 
to restore sustainability to public finances, and 
competitiveness to national economies. Secondly, 
improvements to European economic and fiscal 
governance aim to assure markets that fiscal prof-
ligacy; extreme structural divergences, and private 
debt bubbles will be avoided in the future. Lastly, 
policy makers are extending liquidity to troubled 
sovereigns, and to the banking sector through the 
ECB’s Long-Term Refinancing Operation. How-
ever, this strategy overlooks short-term meas-
ures to stimulate employment, investment and 
demand, and long-term measures to ensure the 
sustainability and prosperity of the European 
economy in a resource constrained world. We 
argue below that green economy reforms can 
potentially bridge these time frames.      
In sum, the European crises can be attributed to 
a series of failures in European fiscal and econom-
ic governance:
 m The failure of the Stability and Growth Pact 
to control fiscal excess, particularly in certain 
Peripheral countries such as Greece. Peripheral 
countries failed to profit from the boom years to 
shore up their budget position, and in the case 
of Greece it actually deteriorated.   
 m The absence of surveillance and governance me-
chanisms to control structural divergences and 
macro-economic imbalances between European 
countries, and private debt bubbles.   
 m In crisis countries the outlook is worsened by 
the absence of the macro-economic adjustment 
mechanisms present in other currency zones, 
such as nominal adjustment, labour market mo-
bility, fiscal transfers or debt mutualisation. 
 m The absence of a credible strategy to break the 
mutually reinforcing spiral of massive fiscal and 
structural adjustments and poor growth pros-
pects in troubled countries.    
1.2. Resource constraints
The section above offered a brief diagnosis of 
the European crises. This section explores the 
evidence for links between resource constraints – 
in particular energy prices – and the 2008/2009 
global financial crisis, and the subsequent Euro-
pean crises. 
1.2.1. Theoretical basis for considering 
energy price-macroeconomic interactions 
Energy price-macroeconomic interactions have 
interested policy makers and analysts since the 
oil price shocks of the 1970s and 1980s. The aca-
demic literature generally agrees that the energy 
price-macroeconomic relation has weakened sub-
sequently, due among other factors to decreased 
oil intensity in the economy; increased flexibility 
in labour markets, and greater monetary policy 
credibility. 
However, the latest research has recently re-
evaluated the oil price-macroeconomic relation 
(Hamilton, 2012; Peersman and Van Robays, 2011; 
Kilian, 2009). In particular, recent literature high-
lights the importance of disentangling the source 
of the oil shock and the characteristics of the im-
porter (Kilian, 2009). For oil importers, increased 
trade and the recycling of oil revenues into global 
capital markets can (temporarily) offset oil price 
shocks arising from global economic booms, i.e. 
demand side oil shocks. Below we explore this in 
the case of the US subprime mortgage crisis and 
the European current account imbalances. On the 
other hand, oil price shocks arising from supply 
side constraints do not entail such offsetting ef-
fects, and can lead directly to reductions in GDP 
and increased inflation.
There are a number of channels for the transmis-
sion of oil prices into inflation:
 m First round direct effects depend on the weight of 
energy products in the Harmonized Consumer 
Price Index (HCPI): HCPI inflation increases 
due to higher oil prices. 
 m First round indirect effects depend on the energy 
intensity of production: industries increase their 
prices to match new energy costs and hence in-
flation rises.  
 m Through second round effects wages are reset to 
catch up with inflation: costs and hence infla-
tion increase. 
 m Through demand effects reductions in aggregate 
demand eventually reduce inflation.
 m Through monetary policy: monetary policy will 
react by raising interest rates to dampen the 
inflationary impact. 
Thus different macroeconomic impacts from an 
oil price shock depend on the nature of the shock, 
and the characteristics of the importing nation. 
In particular, this concerns the different energy 
weights in the HCPI basket; energy intensities and 
energy market structure and regulations; labour 
market characteristics such as indexation and 
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bargaining power of unions; monetary policy, and 
finally the current account position. 
1.2.2. The US: global imbalances, energy 
prices and the subprime crisis
This section traces the potential contribution of 
oil prices to the build up and collapse of the US 
subprime mortgage bubble, which triggered the 
global financial crisis. We do not argue that oil 
prices were the only causal factor; indeed, others 
such as financial deregulation and deliberately 
expansionary monetary policy played a central 
role. The focus here is on separating out the role 
of oil prices, i.e. the various channels by which 
it interacted with the subprime crisis. 
1.2.2.1. Building the bubble: petro-dollars in the 
global savings glut 
A global savings/consumption imbalance leading 
up to the crisis has been identified as an impor-
tant contributing factor. Surplus savings countries 
such as China and oil producers recycled capital 
back into global markets, leading to a liquidity 
glut, pushing down interest rates, and facilitating 
borrowing. “Petro-dollars” were a significant part 
of this global savings/consumption imbalance. In 
2006, oil-exporting countries became the largest 
source of global net capital flows, increasing 348% 
between 2002 and 2006 (McKinsey, 2007). These 
petro-dollars were recycled into, among other 
things, US bonds, which lowered interest rates, 
and also into booming real estate markets, in parti-
cular in developed countries (McKinsey, 2007). 
Thus part of the US subprime mortgage bubble can 
be attributed to the global liquidity glut, of which 
petro-dollars were a significant part. This process 
was recognized as far back as 2005, with Chairman 
of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke stating: 
“During the past few years, the key asset-
price effects of the global saving glut appear to 
have occurred in the market for residential invest-
ment, as low mortgage rates have supported re-
cord levels of home construction and strong gains 
in housing prices…” (Bernanke, 2005).4
It is important to note that petro-dollars were 
not the only source of the global savings glut. 
Rapid economic growth and high savings in Asia 
also played a role, as did the surplus savings of 
rich Americans. The stagnation of the real median 
wage in the US since roughly 1990 also contributed 
to growing indebtedness. As the median real wage 
stagnated, rather than aiming at reducing income 
inequalities, policies to stimulate household con-
sumption were based significantly on encouraging 
4. We are indebted to Dimitri Zenghelis for pointing out 
this quote. 
borrowing, including loose monetary policy and 
mortgage incentives (Rajan, 2011). Some authors 
have argued that growing income inequalities 
were thus an important aspect of the US subprime 
mortgage crisis (Kumhof and Rancière, 2010). In 
addition, financial sector deregulation permitted 
the aggressive sale of subprime mortgages and 
elaborate securitization products, which hid grow-
ing systemic risks. Thus the subprime mortgage 
bubble was created by a combination of factors. 
These included a global liquidity glut, of which 
petrodollars were a significant part; expansion-
ary monetary policies to stimulate debt-based 
consumption in a context of rising inequalities, 
and financial sector deregulation. 
1.2.2.2. Bursting the bubble: interest rates, 
energy prices and aggregate demand 
Oil prices also seem to have contributed to the 
bursting of the US subprime bubble. The interac-
tions are multiple, and should be delineated care-
fully. It is difficult i) to separate out the factors 
leading to increasing mortgage delinquency/
defaults before the crisis, and ii) to identify the 
threshold of mortgage delinquency/defaults, 
which then resulted in the full-blown subprime 
mortgage crisis and the 2008 meltdown of the US, 
then global, financial system.
However, there are a number of channels by 
which oil prices contributed to increasing the 
mortgage delinquency/default rate, by reducing 
household revenues and increasing the household 
debt burden.  
 m Direct energy price channel: between September 
2003 and August 2008 the nominal oil price rose 
from $28.3/barrel to $133.4. In 2003, the ave-
rage suburban household spent $1,422 a year on 
gasoline, which rose to $3,196 in 2008 (Freilich 
et al, 2010). Apart from negative effects on ag-
gregate demand (see below), increased energy 
expenditures reduced household liquidity and 
negatively impacted on mortgage delinquen-
cies/defaults. Kaufman et al. (2010) show 
econometrically that rising household energy 
prices constrained household budgets and in-
creased mortgage delinquency rates, once other 
factors are controlled for. Although they caution 
that identifying the trigger point for the collapse 
of the subprime bubble is difficult, if not impos-
sible, they conclude that “…this analysis indi-
cates that increasing energy expenditures are 
among the most important drivers of the post 
2005 increase in mortgage delinquency rates” 
(Kaufman et al, 2010: 194).  
 m Indirect interest rate channel: Some authors (cf. 
Carr and Beese, 2008) argue that the Federal 
Reserve increased its rates in part because of the 
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sharp oil price rise from 2004 to 2008. The fede-
ral fund rate rose from 1% in May 2005 to 5.26% 
in March 2007. This increased the interest pay-
ments on existing variable interest home loans. 
It also decreased home values, as homebuyers 
factored in the cost of higher interest rates. The 
consequence was a reduction in asset values 
and an increase in liabilities, contributing to the 
increase in mortgage delinquencies/defaults. 
Monetary tightening also impacted negatively 
on aggregate demand (see below).  
A number of contextual factors also interacted 
with the oil price increase to potentially worsen 
vulnerabilities: 
 m Labour market interactions: Peersman and Van 
Robays (2009) show that the inflationary im-
pact of the oil price shock from 2004-2008 was 
reduced in the US due to the structure of the 
labour market. Producers used a strong bar-
gaining position to pass the cost burden onto 
consumers through a reduction in real wages. 
Thus while second-round inflationary impacts 
were mitigated, this was at the expense of a 
decline in real wages. In short, energy costs 
increased and real wages stagnated. This had 
negative impacts on aggregate demand (see 
below), and constrained household budgets.  
 m Distributional impact of energy prices: Gusdorf 
et al (2008) highlight the fact that energy price 
shocks have strong distributional effects, most-
ly impacting energy expenses of households at 
the outskirts of a town, and low-income house-
holds who spend a greater income share on 
energy. Subprime mortgage loans were also 
concentrated on poorer households, leading to 
a confluence of risk factors. 
 m Mal-adapted urban planning: According to 
Karlenzig (2011) urbanization patterns in the 
USA were not adapted to natural resource 
constraints, with a high level of urban sprawl. 
Between 1970 and 2000-7, the distance driven 
per month by the average household increased 
50%, from 1500 to 2200 miles/month (Ramey 
and Vine, 2010). Car dependent urban planning 
increased household exposure to oil prices. 
 m Fuel inefficiency of the vehicle fleet: Sivak and 
Tsimhoni (2009) show that the fuel efficiency 
of the US vehicle fleet barely improved from 
1991 to 2006, increasing from 16.9 to 17.2 miles 
per gallon (mpg). Improvements in the car fleet 
were likewise limited, increasing from 21.2 to 
22.4 mpg 1991-2006.   
 m Depressed consumer spending and aggregate 
demand: rising oil prices also led to a down-
turn in consumer spending and aggregate de-
mand. This operates via a number of channels: 
reduced discretionary income; increased pre-
cautionary savings; operating cost effects, 
whereby consumers are deterred from purcha-
sing energy intensive goods; and reallocation 
effects, whereby the inter and intra-sectoral 
shift of demand from more to less energy inten-
sive goods involves frictions in the reallocation 
of capital and labour. A number of recent stu-
dies have showed that the oil price spike of the 
2000s had a negative impact on consumer US 
spending and aggregate demand (Hamilton, 
2009; Edelstein and Kilian, 2009; Ramey and 
Vine, 2010). 
 m In particular, the automobile sector plays a key 
role in transmitting the oil price shock to a 
reduction in aggregate demand. Consumers 
cut down on auto purchases, and a frictional 
shift from more to less energy intensive models 
took place (Ramey and Vine, 2010). There also 
seems to have been a shift from energy inten-
sive domestic vehicles to less energy intensive 
imported vehicles (Edelstein and Kilian, 2009), 
although separating out energy price/exchange 
rate effects may be difficult. Hamilton (2009) 
estimates econometrically that the decline of 
the US auto-sector shaved 0.7% of GDP over 
2007:Q4 – 2008:Q4, while seasonally adjusted 
employment in the auto-sector fell by 125 000 
between July 2007 and August 2008. The de-
cline of the US auto sector was an important 
contributing factor in tipping the US into re-
cession in Q4 2007, although there was clear-
ly a mutually reinforcing interaction between 
the recessionary slide and the decline of the 
autosector. As jobs were lost and wages fell, the 
mild recession exacerbated the subprime crisis, 
which burst in Q3 2008 throwing the financial 
sector and the real economy into meltdown. 
In sum, there seems to be a solid evidence 
basis for considering oil prices and mal-adap-
tation in the US housing and auto sectors as im-
portant contributing factors to the US subprime 
crisis. This is by no means to suggesting that oil 
prices were the only factor; numerous other fac-
tors increased and eventually exposed the system-
ic risk in the US housing and financial sectors. 
1.2.4. Europe: impact of energy prices on 
the macroeconomy, current account, and 
monetary policy 
This section investigates the impact of energy 
prices on Europe’s macroeconomy, current account 
and monetary policy. In comparison with the US, 
the literature on the energy price-macroeconomic 
interaction in Europe is more limited. The aim 
is to assess whether asymmetric reactions to 
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energy price increases could have contributed 
to the destabilisation of the Eurozone. 
1.2.4.1. Macroeconomic impacts: historical 
analysis and prospective studies       
There are a number of ex post studies investiga-
ting the impact of energy price increases on the 
macro-economy in Europe (Hahn and Mestre, 
2011; Carstensen et al, 2011; Peersman and Van 
Robays, 2009; Gómez-Loscos et al, 2011). Hahn 
and Mestre (2011) provides a historical perspec-
tive, using a VAR model to analyse energy price-
macroeconomic interactions from 1970-2009. The 
study shows that oil prices have had a substantial 
impact on GDP and inflation across the period, 
including during the recent 2008/9 recession. 
This result is consistent with Carstensen et al 
(2011) for Germany and Gómez-Loscos et al (2011) 
for Spain, both of which show a negative GDP 
impact of oil price increases contributing to the 
2008/9 recession. 
In addition to the ECB’s retrospective economet-
ric analysis, ECB (2010) provides a model-based 
analysis of the interaction between energy pric-
es, inflation and GDP. Their results show that a 
moderate, permanent 10% rise in oil prices would 
reduce Eurozone GDP by 0.24%, with quite het-
erogeneous results across countries. Among the 
worst impacted are Belgium, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, and Spain, due to the importance of ener-
gy costs in production and consumption in these 
countries. Employment impacts are particularly 
severe for Spain, Italy and Greece. The study fur-
ther shows that negative impacts in Germany may 
have been offset by recycling of petrodollars in the 
German export sector. 
1.2.4.2. Current account balance
In fact, the above quoted modelling results from 
ECB (2010) do not take into account the nature of 
the oil shock, i.e. a supply verses demand shock; 
terms of trade effects, nor the recycling of oil 
revenues into the EU economy. Peersman and Van 
Robays (2009), for example, speculate that for 
Germany the negative price impact of the 2004-
2008 oil price boom was mitigated by increased 
exports, a point confirmed empirically by Cars-
tensen et al (2011).
Modelling by ECB (2010) shows that consider-
ing terms of trade effects can change the picture 
presented above. Figure 2 below shows firstly 
the energy current account position of Eurozone 
countries in percent of GDP under an oil price in-
crease from $52 to $100/bbl, assuming firstly that 
zero percent of the increased revenues accrued to 
oil exporters is spent on foreign goods (zero terms 
of trade effect). Secondly, it shows the energy cur-
rent account under the same conditions, this time 
assuming that 60% of oil revenues are spent on 
foreign goods (60% terms of trade effect). This is 
roughly in line with historical estimates of terms 
of trade effects; the movement of oil price from 
$52 to $100 is consistent with what occurred from 
2004-2008. 
Figure 2. Energy current account impact of 100% rise in oil price under two scenarios of terms of trade interactions
Source: ECB 2010 
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The analysis confirms the results of Carstens-
en’s et al (2011) analysis of the oil price impact 
on Germany leading up to the crises. It suggests 
that in some countries the macroeconomic reac-
tion to oil prices is buffered by terms of trade ef-
fects, assuming that the price shock results from 
increased global demand and hence was asso-
ciated with increased trade and foreign capital 
inflows. This effect would not be present in the 
case of a supply side shock. The asymmetric 
reactions of current accounts to oil price in-
creases (compare Germany with Portugal and 
Spain) suggests that energy prices played a 
role in divergent current accounts leading up 
to the crises. This operated by both the direct 
channel, i.e. asymmetric import dependency and 
oil intensity of GDP; and an indirect channel, by 
which some countries were able to improve their 
current account position from increased global 
trade during the demand boom. 
1.2.4.3. Monetary policy 
Asymmetric inflationary reactions to energy prices 
could distort monetary policy in a single currency 
zone. Indeed, as noted above in Section 1.1., pro-
cyclical distortions in Eurozone monetary policy 
was one of the factors behind the crises. In investi-
gating this factor, the literature has largely focused 
on real wage differentials. However, asymmetric 
reactions to energy prices may also be of poten-
tial concern (EC, 2011a). A number of studies 
have looked at the transmission of energy price 
shocks into Eurozone inflation (Peersman and 
Van Robays, 2009; ECB, 2010; Carstensen, 2009, 
Álvarez et al, 2011; Gómez-Loscos et al, 2011). 
As noted in Section 1.2.1. above, there are sev-
eral channels for the transmission of energy prices 
into inflation. Direct effects depend on the energy 
intensity of the economy; the weight of energy in 
the HICP, and the nature and regulation of the en-
ergy market, among other factors. Indirect effects 
depend on the structure and regulation of the 
product and labour markets, particularly on the 
degree of wage indexation. 
The literature suggests that there are asym-
metric direct inflation effects between Eurozone 
Member States. These are related to structural 
factors such as the energy intensity of production 
and consumption, and energy market structure 
and regulation (ECB, 2010). This suggests that 
closer coordination of energy policy – energy ef-
ficiency, market regulation and integration, and 
diversification/decarbonization policy – may be 
necessary in order to minimize direct energy in-
flation divergences between Eurozone Member 
States (EC, 2011a). Nonetheless, the literature is 
fairly clear that indirect effects, particularly wage 
indexation in the long-run, are a more important 
cause of energy price driven inflation divergences 
than structurally caused direct effects (Peersman 
and Van Robays, 2009). 
Peersman and Van Robays (2009) show econo-
metrically that energy inflation, particularly 
through the wage indexation channel, distorted 
European monetary policy, with pro-cyclical ef-
fects, leading up to the crises. In some countries, 
energy price increases were followed by wage in-
creases, increasing inflation further. High infla-
tion reduced real interest rates, facilitating bor-
rowing, consumption and economic activity.    
A comparison with the US is instructive. As 
shown in Section 1.2.2. above, US labour market 
flexibility mitigated the second round inflation-
ary impacts of the 2004-8 oil price shock, at the 
expense of reduced real wages. In Europe by con-
trast, in particular in some Peripheral countries, 
real wages were relatively preserved at the ex-
pense of second round inflation. Thus the negative 
macroeconomic impact of the oil price boom was 
demand-led in the US, as consumers’ and house-
holds’ budgets were constrained. In Europe it was 
supply-led, as inflationary pressures reduced the 
competitiveness of certain Eurozone economies. 
Energy price inflation, and associated wage index-
ation, played a role therein. The example of the 
US warns, however, against assuming that labour 
market flexibility reduces macroeconomic vulner-
abilities to oil price increases.  
This discussion should be interpreted with care. 
Firstly, it shows that structural factors, such as en-
ergy intensity, were secondary to indirect wage 
effects in determining the transmission of energy 
price increases to inflation. Secondly, energy in-
flation and associated wage increases were only 
one, and likely secondary, factor behind the loss 
of competitiveness and pro-cyclical distortion 
of monetary policy that lay behind the crises in 
Peripheral countries. Nonetheless, this section 
does provide an evidence base suggesting that 
asymmetric reaction to energy prices were one 
of the factors that contributed to widening the 
destabilisation of the Eurozone. Energy policy 
should potentially be considered among the struc-
tural factors around which greater Eurozone co-
ordination could be necessary in order to avoid 
structural divergences, monetary policy distor-
tions, and macroeconomic imbalances.
2. thE NEEd For sustaiNablE aNd 
iNclusiVE macroEcoNomics
The concept of the green economy has recently 
entered into the work of numerous international 
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organizations (e.g. OECD, 2011). We define a 
green economy as one, which creates welfare, while 
ensuring that natural assets continue to provide the 
resources and environmental services necessary for 
welfare in the future, and guaranteeing social cohe-
sion today. In this section we first review the struc-
tural drivers of the green economy, i.e. growing 
resource constraints and environmental damages. 
These factors make shifting towards a green 
economy vital for long-term prosperity. Then we 
describe the green economy, i.e. its characteristics 
and relation to traditional economic indicators 
such as GDP. Finally, we make the argument that 
the green economy should form a central pillar of 
the EU crises response. 
2.1. Structural drivers of 
the green economy
After a century of decline, real prices for a broad 
range of commodities have increased dramatically 
between roughly 2000 and the present (figure 3). 
This price trend is being driven by demographic, 
economic, and environmental factors. The develo-
ping world, especially India and China, is currently 
experiencing economic growth at a rate and scale 
without historic precedent. By 2030, the world will 
see another 3 billion people enter the middle class 
(McKinsey, 2011). By 2050, global economic output 
is projected to quadruple and the global population 
to reach 9.2 billion (OECD, 2012). Unless economic 
growth can be decoupled from resource inputs, 
and resource inputs decoupled from environmental 
damages, the resulting environmental damages 
and resource scarcity could eventually threaten 
economic growth (Stern, 2007; OECD, 2012).  
The boom in demand for resources is also pos-
ing a challenge to resource supply. To meet grow-
ing demand and offset declining production, the 
world will have to add 47 million barrels/day of 
gross oil production capacity by 2035, twice the 
current total oil production of all OPEC countries 
in the Middle East (IEA, 2011). The IEA projects 
oil prices to remain high, reaching 120 USD in real 
terms by 2035, 210 USD in nominal terms (IEA, 
2011). Supply growth for water and land will have 
to accelerate by 140% and 179-248% respectively 
compared to supply growth over the last 20 years, 
in order to meet “business as usual” demand 
growth to 2030 (McKinsey, 2011). Global resource 
extraction is projected to increase from 65 billion 
tons currently to 82 billion tons in 2020, and 140 
billion tons in 2050 (UNEP, 2011). These demand 
trends are likely to place severe pressures on sup-
ply chains, prices and the environment.   
Technological improvements may open up new 
resources (e.g. shale gas). However, several factors 
warn against technological complacency. Firstly, 
the marginal costs of resource extraction are in-
creasing, both in monetary and resource terms. In 
other words, resource extraction is itself growing 
more resource intensive (McKinsey, 2011; UNEP, 
2011). In the case of oil, for example, historical 
production increases have occurred through the 
exploitation of new, less productive fields (Hamil-
ton, 2012). Shale gas production is associated with 
increased resource inputs, rapid declines in mar-
ginal returns and potentially significant local en-
vironmental damages. Thus while some resources, 
such as fossil fuels, may not be physically scarce, 
decreasing marginal returns create economic scar-
city and limits to the rate at which production can 
increase.  
Secondly, as outlined above, the scale of the 
supply challenge is enormous, creating risks of 
supply bottlenecks. In the case of some resourc-
es, such as rare earth metals, very rapid demand 
growth in coming decades and concentration of 
production in a few countries could create sup-
ply bottlenecks and geopolitical vulnerabilities 
(JRC, 2011).
Thirdly, environmental constraints to resource 
extraction will become increasingly biting. In this 
regard, the concept of “planetary boundaries” has 
recently been proposed, describing thresholds in 
global bio-physical systems, beyond which non-
linear environmental degradation would have se-
riously deleterious consequences for human wel-
fare (Rockström et al, 2009). Examples include 
the ability of the global carbon and nitrogen cycles 
to absorb carbon and nitrogen wastes from hu-
man activities without major, irreversible changes 
to global biophysical systems. Thus limitations in 
the absorptive capacity of biophysical systems 
should be considered as part of actual physical 
resource scarcity. However, internalising such 
external costs will clearly require policy.   
At the same time, the price and volatility of 
different resources are increasingly correlated 
(World Bank, 2010). This is due to increasingly 
connected global markets, including global fi-
nancial markets. In addition, growing substitut-
ability between resources, such as energy, food 
crops, and land, promotes price correlations 
within and between resource groups. In addition, 
as noted above marginal resource extraction is it-
self growing more resource intensive. As a result 
of market linkage, substitutability, and grow-
ing resource intensity of production, resource 
prices are now more volatile and correlated 
than at any other time in the last century, as 
shown in figure 3 (McKinsey, 2011). Via these 
mechanisms, economic, geopolitical or environ-
mental perturbations can spread throughout the 
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global economic system, implying a high degree 
of systemic risk to economic and indeed geopo-
litical stability.5
These factors suggest that scarcity pressures 
will remain, and a high economic premium will 
be placed on improving resource efficiency, and 
decoupling resource use from environmental im-
pacts (McKinsey, 2011). As summarized by the 
OECD, the current trajectory “…risks exceeding 
biophysical limits or tipping points, and caus-
ing non-linear large-scale (systemic) irreversible 
damages…” (OECD, 2012:49). The imperative to 
change direction is clear.
2.2. What is the green economy?
In this context, the green economy integrates envi-
ronmental and resource constraints in economic 
development trajectories and policies. In this 
section, we summarize the characteristics of the 
green economy. This is not an exhaustive list, but 
seeks to refine our definition provided above. 
 m Focus on other metrics than just GDP. An econo-
mic transformation towards a green economy 
will require a shift in how we measure econo-
mic/social progress. It is becoming increasingly 
clear that GDP as a metric does not offer useful 
answers to current challenges (see Stiglitz et al., 
2009; Helm, 2011). It is not a good metric for 
measuring wealth distribution, as the Ameri-
can example above has shown (see part 1.2.2). 
It says nothing about the maintenance of eco-
nomic, physical and environmental assets. As 
the economic crisis showed in Greece, it cannot 
be assumed that future growth will compensate 
5. For example, it is fairly clear that energy and in particular 
food price inflation was an important trigger of social 
unrest that exploded into the Arab Spring. 
for the depletion of assets or accumulation of 
liabilities. The threat that climate change poses 
to future growth reinforces this point from the 
environmental perspective (Stern, 2007). 
 m The location of such environmental thresholds 
is uncertain, as is the ability to decouple growth 
from physical inputs, or physical inputs from en-
vironmental damages. The latter will depend on 
the elasticity of substitution between “dirty” and 
“clean” modes of production and consumption, 
i.e. the rate of social and technological change. 
It is clear, however, that the rate of depreciation 
of natural assets and dirty/clean substitutability 
is not fully exogenous, but depends also on poli-
cy responses (Acemoglu, 2009; Hourcade et al, 
2011; Helm, 2011). In this uncertain context, it 
is not useful to focus on GDP growth rates as 
an indicator of either environmental sustai-
nability or social progress. What matters more 
than growth rate is the content of production. 
Does it maintain physical and environmental 
capital? Does it improve intellectual capital to 
facilitate decoupling of physical inputs and en-
vironmental damages? Does it create jobs and 
address inequalities? This is the approach we 
adopt in the paper.  
 m High rate and scale of innovation in socio-tech-
nical systems. The green economy envisages a 
large-scale transformation of the global eco-
nomy over the coming decades. The transition 
will likely induce dramatic social, economic and 
technical innovations (Preston, 2012). Energy 
management companies help actors reduce 
their energy consumption and are paid by their 
energy savings. Other types of structures focus 
on increased sharing of production factors. Pro-
duct-service systems, like bike or car sharing, 
potentially enable more efficient use of assets 
through a redefinition of conventional property 
Figure 3. McKinsey global commodity price index (left); commodity price volatility (right)
Source: McKinsey, 2011 (left); Ellen MacArthur Foundation (2012)
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rights. Energy cooperatives, in which decision-
making is shared between producers, workers, 
consumers and local authorities may enable 
better information sharing among actors, and 
more socially desirable economic choices. Re-
source recycling offers whole new supply chain 
options.
 m Large aggregate opportunities but distributional 
consequences within and between sectors. This 
shift from “brown” to “green” modes of produc-
tion and consumption entails large distributio-
nal consequences. Nonetheless, the aggregate 
opportunities appear significant. For example, 
McKinsey (2011) modelled a resource producti-
vity scenario to meet the resource supply chal-
lenge to 2030. They assessed 130 measures to 
increase resource productivity across all sectors, 
70% of which would have an internal rate of 
return above 10% at current prices. They valued 
the potential resource productivity gains at 2.9 
trillion USD p.a. in 2030. McKinsey estimates 
that the shift towards the green economy in the 
EU could save companies USD 340 to 380 billion 
p.a. in material costs, or 3% of EU GDP in 2010, 
under the moderate scenario (Ellen MacArthur 
Foundation, 2012). This indicates the scale of 
the economic shift possible, and the potential 
aggregate opportunities.
This combination of a high rate and scale of 
socio-technical innovation, and the distribu-
tional aspects of the transition, imply that 
policy makers and business actors need to anti-
cipate and respond strategically to emerging 
trends. Policies such as labour market or indus-
trial policies will be necessary to accompany 
this shift. 
 m Strong role for policy to correct market failures 
and create new markets. Price and resource scar-
city will not be sufficient to induce the neces-
sary transition. A number of market failures, 
in particular pollution externalities such as cli-
mate change and innovation spillovers, mean 
that governments will have to intervene to opti-
mise and create new markets. This can also have 
positive economic consequences by inducing a 
more efficient use of economic resources (Hal-
legatte et al, 2011).    
2.3. Towards an integration of 
green macroeconomics in the 
European crises response
Europe’s crises require multiple responses, 
amounting to a wide reaching reform of Europe’s 
economy and governance. This context is both a 
challenge and an opportunity for shifting towards 
a green economy. There are voices arguing that 
environmental issues should be delayed until after 
the recovery. This is ill advised for three reasons. 
Firstly, delay in shifting towards a sustainable 
economy will entail higher costs and greater risks, 
due to infrastructure lock-in; delayed innovation, 
and higher environmental damages (Hallegatte 
et al, 2011; IEA, 2011). In the long term, resource 
intensive growth will not be sustainable, as high 
resource prices and environmental damages will 
constrain it (Stern, 2007; OECD, 2012). 
Secondly, the “delay argument” misses the fact 
that there are large political opportunity costs to 
delaying the transition. The crises are giving the 
urgency and political feasibility to implement dif-
ficult reforms. These are perceived by policy-mak-
ers, particularly in Germany, as necessary to lay 
sustainable foundations for long-term European 
economic prosperity. However, this strategy over-
looks short-term measures to reduce inequalities, 
stimulate employment and investment and long-
term measures to ensure the sustainability and 
prosperity of the European economy in a resource- 
constrained world. A shift towards a sustainable 
economy can potentially bridge these time frames, 
and the crises context can give political urgency to 
implement them. 
Thirdly, reforms for a transition towards a green 
economy, such as environmental taxation, invest-
ment policies, and innovation can potentially com-
plement the current crises response. In order to 
assess potential synergies between green economy 
policy reforms and the current crises response, we 
construct a matrix of short and long-term objec-
tives for European economic policy (See Table 2). 
This is not intended to be an exhaustive list or to 
justify the objectives. Rather we aim to cluster rel-
evant objectives for the purpose of gathering as-
sessment criteria. In part 3 below, we assess three 
green economy instruments against these objec-
tives, namely environmental fiscal reform, green 
investment and green innovation policies. 
3. towards aN iNtEGratioN 
oF thE GrEEN EcoNomY: 
sYNErGiEs aNd iNstrumENts
3.1. Environmental tax reform
3.1.1. The rationale for and principles of 
fiscal reform in the current context
A consideration of Environmental Tax Reform 
(ETR) should be embedded within the current 
context. Eurozone Member States are faced with 
multiple conflicting challenges, including fiscal 
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consolidation, high unemployment and structural 
reforms to increase competitiveness of certain 
sectors. In response, fiscal reforms have focused 
on several issues: 
 m Increasing revenues: around one third of Mem-
ber States implemented revenue-increasing 
measures in 2011. The EU average for the total 
tax burden (including social security contribu-
tions) increased from 39.8% in 2010 to 40.2% of 
GDP in 2011 (EC, 2011g), mostly due to discretio-
nary measures.
 m Creating employment incentives: the Commis-
sion’s 2012 Annual Growth survey notes that a 
shift away from labour taxation can create em-
ployment (EC, 2011c). As EC (2011g) notes, in 
most countries fiscal reforms responding to the 
crises were integrated into broader tax reforms, 
including the shift of the tax burden from labour 
or capital to consumption (in Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Hungary, Lithuania and Holland) or 
increased property taxation (in Czech Republic, 
Germany, Greece, France, Latvia and Portugal). 
 m Addressing distributional concerns: the crises 
have resulted in a sharp increase in unemploy-
ment and inequality, already at historically high 
levels before 2007. The EC also notes an “overall 
tendency towards a steeper progression in per-
sonal income tax” among member states in 2011. 
In Spain, Greece, Portugal, UK, Latvia, France 
and Luxembourg for instance, there were at-
tempts to increase income tax progressivity via 
higher top marginal tax rates. But some authors 
have argued that tax systems remain highly re-
gressive, given the importance of indirect taxa-
tion (VAT) in the overall tax burden. Piketty et 
al (2010), show that French median households 
spend 50% of their income in taxes, while the 
0.1% richest households have a total tax burden 
of only 35%. Thus fiscal reforms should consider 
the distributional consequences of both direct 
and indirect taxation. 
 m Addressing competitiveness concerns: there is the 
perception that high labour costs in some Peri-
pheral countries were one of the reasons behind 
the crises in the Eurozone. In this context, there 
has been increased interest in the possibility of a 
tax shift away from labour towards consumption. 
This is seen as one means to lower labour costs, 
while reducing direct impacts on net wages. For 
example, modeling by de Mooij and Keen (2012) 
suggests that such a labour-consumption taxa-
tion shift would increase export competitiveness 
in the Eurozone, and may be a means to address 
structural divergences and macroeconomic im-
balances between Member States. 
 m However, there are a number of reasons to be 
skeptical. Firstly, cost-competitiveness is only 
one dimension of price-competitiveness, itself 
only one dimension of external competitiveness. 
Secondly, as noted above, increasing consump-
tion taxes such as VAT has regressive distribu-
tional consequences, i.e. hitting hardest the dis-
posable income of the poorest, pensioners and 
unemployed. Thirdly, in the Eurozone context, 
lowering labour costs via a labour-consumption 
tax shift is a non-cooperative approach. None-
theless, acting on labour taxes can be one tool to 
address cost competitiveness concerns. 
3.1.2. The opportunity for and potential of 
environmental fiscal reform
In this context, ETR could offer a number of attrac-
tions. It offers the opportunity to recycle revenues 
through either a reduction of the tax burden 
on socially desirable activities such as labour or 
investment; increases government investment, or 
fiscal consolidation. In the current crises context, 
it may offer a means to meet multiple policy 
Table 2. Matrix of short and long-term objectives for European economic policy in the current crises response.
Short-to 
mid-term
objective rationale
Fiscal consolidation Markets do not perceive the fiscal positions of some Peripheral countries as 
sustainable. Therefore, fiscal consolidation is necessary to reduce interest rates and 
induce investment within troubled countries.
Job creation Unemployment is at record high levels in the Eurozone, risking social tension and 
long-term alienation from the labour market.
Reducing inequalities The crises have led to a sharp spike in economic inequalities within countries. 
Apart from the human cost thereof, this risks the social sustainability of the reform 
measures undertaken.
Mid-to 
long-term
Reducing intra-EU/intra-
Eurozone imbalances
These crises were clearly the product of structural divergences and macroeconomic 
imbalances between Eurozone countries. As currently devised, measures to reduce 
imbalances will likely take 5-10 years to bear fruit.
Competitiveness Maintaining competitiveness is crucial to maintaining desirable, globally contested 
economic activities in Europe, and hence employment and prosperity.
Increased economic 
resilience
Resource constraints and supply risks pose systemic risks to prosperity in the long 
term.
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objectives, including creating employment and 
addressing environmental goals. Differential tax 
rates between countries, fuels and sectors also 
create distortions in the internal market, ineffi-
ciencies in environmental policy, and foregone 
revenues. But these impacts are complex and must 
be thought from the angle of broader tax reforms 
within a context of increased European coordina-
tion on fiscal policy. 
3.1.2.1. Fiscal consolidation 
Environmental tax reform could create signifi-
cant revenues. Over the past decade, environ-
mental taxation has been falling as a percentage 
of GDP in the Eurozone,6 and there are large 
differences between Member States (EC, 2011d). 
Environmental taxation ranges from 4.8% and 
4.0% of GDP in Denmark and the Netherlands, 
to 1.6% of GDP in Spain with the EU27 average 
at 2.4%. Energy taxation ranged from 3.0% 
of GDP in Slovenia to 1.2% in Greece, with the 
EU27 average at 1.8%. The Commission estimates 
that direct revenue losses from environmentally 
harmful subsidies may reach 0.5% of GDP (EC, 
2011c). A higher auctioning price in the ETS 
would create another ~0.2% p.a.7 of GDP. Imple-
menting the Commission’s proposed energy taxa-
tion directive would create up to 0.33% of GDP 
p.a. It should be noted that revenue positive 
ETR may reduce or offset the economic bene-
fits of recycling revenues via a reduction in 
employment taxation. 
3.1.2.2. Employment creation 
By contrast, if revenues are recycled via reductions 
in social security contributions or income tax, ETR 
can potentially deliver a “double dividend”:  
 m Firstly, pricing the external costs of environ-
mentally damaging activities can bring about 
welfare improvements through reduced envi-
ronmental damages (first dividend). 
 m Secondly, revenues can be used to reduce distor-
tionary taxation on labour and investment. The 
imposition of new taxes in the resource sector 
will induce a deadweight loss. At the same time, 
the reduction of taxes on labour or investment 
will induce a welfare gain. Under certain condi-
tions, the net welfare result from the recycling 
of revenues can be positive, i.e. the creation of 
employment and potentially economic growth 
(second dividend). 
6. 2.3-2.6% of GDP in 2009, down from 2.6-2.7% of GDP in 
2000,  
7. Under a carbon price of €30/ton by 2020. Based on 
Cooper et al (2011)
The literature on the potential of labour-resource 
tax substitution to create an employment double 
dividend is large and complex. Most authors see 
the labour market situation as a crucial factor, in 
order to preserve the reduction in labour costs 
and maintain the employment effect (Carraro and 
Siniscalco eds, 1996; Kratena, 2002). The current 
Eurozone context of macroeconomic disequilib-
rium and significant unemployment would likely 
reduce possibilities of upwards renegotiation of 
real wages.  
Secondly, the type and magnitude of existing tax 
distortions will influence the outcome of ETR. If 
the tax burden is shifted from the relatively over-
taxed production factor (labour) to the under-
taxed production factor (energy/carbon), a net 
gain of employment could accrue. In this regard, 
the Commission calculates that one third of Euro-
zone MS could increase employment by reducing 
labour taxation, which varies widely between MS 
(EC, 2011e). 
Many European Member States such as Den-
mark, Sweden, Finland, Germany or the UK al-
ready have significant experience with ETR. The 
literature on the macroeconomic impacts of ETR is 
large and still open for further research. However, 
general points of consensus in academic analysis 
and ex post assessment have been reached (Hour-
cade et al, 2010): 
 m ETR with revenue recycling always provides 
superior welfare outcomes compared to ETR 
without recycling.
 m Net employment gains can be attained if re-
venues are recycled via a reduction in social 
contributions or income taxes. A meta-analy-
sis of European studies shows that a majority 
find that ETR brings about net positive employ-
ment gains, if labour costs are reduced via reduc-
tions in employers’ social security contributions 
(Hoerner and Bosquet, 2001). The assumption 
of non-equilibrium labour markets with invo-
luntary unemployment is an important condi-
tion for this result (Kratena, 2002). The elasti-
city of substitution between labour and energy 
is also vital in determining the employment out-
come. In the short-term, this may be restricted 
by the lock-in of energy intensive capital stock; 
in the longer-term, as the capital stock evolves, 
the elasticity of substitution may increase. Thus 
it is important to consider ETR from a dynamic 
perspective.    
 m Very small impacts on GDP levels (±0.5%), with 
a majority of studies showing a net GDP gain. 
For example, countries that implemented car-
bon tax ETR show small GDP impacts, with the 
balance on the positive side (Andersen, 2010; 
Agnolucci, 2009). 
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Thus, while a double dividend is by no means 
assured, ETR does seem to offer the potential to 
deliver both environmental and employment ben-
efits, if the tax burden on labour can be effectively 
reduced. 
3.1.2.3. Reducing inequalities 
Regarding distributional issues, the extensive lite-
rature on ETR points to some generally applicable 
conclusions. Household fuel/energy taxes tend to 
be socially regressive, as poor households spend 
a greater portion of income on fuel consumption. 
Motor fuel taxes can impact the lower and middle 
class disproportionally, as well as rural house-
holds. Rural households, the unemployed and 
retired tend to be the most vulnerable groups, and 
these would not necessarily benefit from labour 
tax reform. 
However, the distributional impact of ETR is, 
firstly, dwarfed by the distributional impact of 
other indirect taxes, e.g. VAT. Secondly, combin-
ing ETR with a broader tax reform can improve 
distributional outcomes. Comprehensive reform 
could include payroll tax measures targeting the 
lowest income deciles (which can also improve the 
employment outcomes), plus targeted transfers to 
particularly vulnerable groups such as pension-
ers, low income workers and the unemployed. 
These should be designed so as to preserve the 
price signal arising from the change in relative 
prices but without hampering economically fragile 
households. 
In short, there is no mechanical connection 
between ETR and distribution outcomes. Distri-
bution outcomes depend on the recycling meth-
od and politically acceptable compromises can 
be found, i.e. integration of ETR within broader 
tax reforms.
3.1.2.4. Increasing competitiveness 
In addition to distributional concerns, there are 
concerns around potential competitiveness effects 
of ETR. The Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH), 
i.e. that environmental regulation leads to the 
off-shoring of environmentally damaging produc-
tion, has been subject to much study. The large 
literature is not unequivocal, and suggests that 
PHH effects may be limited a very small number 
of specific industries, and that production factor 
endowments (human capital, physical capital, 
natural capital) far outweigh any significance of 
environmental regulation. For example, Quirion 
and Hourcade (2004) show that an EU carbon 
tax in energy intensive sectors, without any recy-
cling, would have lower impact on firms’ marginal 
costs than inter-annual exchange rate variations. 
Econometric analysis from the UK, using a natural 
random experiment with a control and trial group 
of firms, show that the Climate Change Levy had a 
positive impact on energy intensity but fail to see 
any negative effect on firm performance (Martin 
et al. 2011). In Section 3.3.2.1. below we discuss the 
potential positive competitiveness impacts of envi-
ronmental regulation. 
In sum, negative competitiveness impacts of 
ETR are likely to be limited to a small handful of 
industries. Politically acceptable approaches to 
cushion these impacts are possible.   
3.1.3 Conclusions and way forward  
ETR could form part of a broader fiscal reform in 
European Member States and at the EU level. It 
offers the opportunity to shift taxes from labour 
to resource consumption, creating employment 
and reducing environmental bads. This goes in the 
direction of existing fiscal reforms to address the 
crises, but has the added benefit of not targeting 
consumption in general. Distributional issues are 
key, but smart policy design can address these.
There is a need for further, detailed research 
on the potential of environmental fiscal reform in 
individual Member States, i.e. identifying Mem-
ber States with an attractive combination of high 
unemployment, high labour taxation particularly 
at the lowest marginal rates, and lower environ-
mental taxation. In addition, further research 
could address the aspect of European coordina-
tion, identifying the objectives and contribution 
of ETR to address European challenges such as re-
ducing structural divergences and macroeconomic 
imbalances. 
3.2. Green investment
3.2.1. The rationale for and principles of 
investment in the current context
Current high sovereign bond spreads in Peripheral 
countries and tightened bank credit standards 
highlight the need for public and private deleve-
raging. However, they are also a symptom of weak 
growth prospects. Progress with deleveraging will 
be slow if GDP growth remains weak. And GDP 
growth prospects are weak precisely because the 
private and public sectors are deleveraging. In 
this section we survey contextual elements for the 
argument for an investment program within the 
crises response.
Figure 4 below shows the financial balances of 
the public, private and external sector in Germany, 
Spain, Ireland, and Greece. The public balance is 
the public deficit or surplus; private balance is pri-
vate net borrowing or saving, and the external sec-
tor is the current account deficit or surplus. Thus 
these variables represent flows, not stocks.
workiNG papEr 09/20122 2 iddri
Exiting the crisis in the right direction: a sustainable and shared prosperity plan for Europe
Several points are worthy of note. Firstly, with 
the exception of Greece, the debt crises began 
in the private sector, as Peripheral governments 
ran surpluses during the boom years. The private 
sector is now engaged in strong deleveraging, as 
evidenced by the jump in private balances, i.e. 
the shift to net private saving. Secondly, this has 
been accompanied by significant growth in pub-
lic sector deficit. Thirdly, there has been a large 
imbalance in the current account and private 
balance between Germany and the Peripheral 
countries. 
Figure 5 below shows quarterly real interest 
rates8 in Germany and the Peripheral countries 
since 2000. Two observations stand out. Firstly, 
Peripheral countries experienced periods of near 
zero or even negative real interest rates during 
the boom years. This distortion in European 
monetary policy created significant incentives 
for the cross-boarder capital flows and domestic 
private borrowing that led to the crises, as noted 
above. Secondly, subsequent to the crises, real 
interest rates have exploded in Peripheral coun-
tries, reflecting uncertainty over the fiscal and 
8. Real interest rates = nominal interest rate – inflation. 
macroeconomic situation. As a corollary of this, 
real interest rates have gone negative in Germa-
ny and the UK.9 This reflects simple supply and 
demand, as significant private savings search for 
scarce “safe haven” investment options (Zenghe-
lis, 2011).  
Figure 6 below shows investment in gross fixed 
capital formation as a percent of GDP since 1970. 
It highlights the progressive decline in infrastruc-
ture investment, infrastructure broadly defined as 
fixed assets. Some authors (Helm, 2011) have ar-
gued that GDP growth in recent decades has been 
overly based on the depreciation of existing assets 
and indeed the accumulation of financial debt. 
Maintaining prosperity will require maintaining 
the quality of assets, which may not have been the 
case over preceding decades. In this context, sig-
nificant investments in Europe’s productive assets 
(i.e. renewable energy infrastructures) will likely 
be required over the coming decades. 
From this contextual discussion several conclu-
sions can be drawn to inform the following sec-
tions on green investment: 
9. Relatively high inflation rates in the UK also played a role 
in depressing real interest rates. In 2011, they averaged 
3.9%, compared to 1.9% in Germany.    
Figure 4. Sectoral financial balances in % GDP 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat
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 m Peripheral countries are now caught in a vicious 
circle of recession, austerity and private sector 
deleveraging. The current disincentive to in-
vestment is evident in real interest rates shown 
above. Yet unless there is some macroeconomic 
stimulus, the fiscal and social burden of adjust-
ment may not be sustainable. 
 m Providing macroeconomic stimulus is a Euro-
pean public good (Dullien and Schwarzer, 2011). 
Capital is available and there is a dearth of per-
ceived safe investments, as shown by negative 
real interest rates in Germany and the UK. But 
surplus capital and safe investment opportuni-
ties are not shared equally around Europe, as 
evidenced in the spread of real interest rates 
above. A European approach is needed to pro-
vide European macroeconomic stimulus, and 
inward investment in Peripheral countries.   
Figure 6. Gross fixed capital formation as % of GDP
Figure 5. Quarterly real interest rates
Source: World Bank data 
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat
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 m In coming decades, Europe likely stands before 
significant investment needs to renew its pro-
ductive infrastructure. This provides an oppor-
tunity to coordinate the large-scale invest-
ments needed; the need to provide inward 
investment and macro-economic stimulus in 
Peripheral countries, and the current surplus 
capital available to some Member States. The 
green sector is arguably a clear candidate for 
such an investment program. 
3.2.2. The opportunity for and potential of 
green investment
A macroeconomic stimulus plan would need to 
adopt a number of approaches. Arguably, it should 
include measures to reduce interest rates in Peri-
pheral countries, potentially through some form of 
debt mutualisation (EC, 2011f). Others have called 
for significant European reinvestment programs 
in Peripheral countries (Schwarzer, 2012; Marzi-
notto, 2011). For a number of reasons, we argue 
that green investments, particularly in energy-
producing and consuming infrastructure, should 
be an important part of a macroeconomic stimulus 
plan for Europe, and troubled Member States.     
Firstly, it is of large scale. The Commission es-
timates that delivering a low-carbon economy 
by 2050 will require an increase in investment of 
1.5% of GDP, roughly returning investment to its 
average over the 1985-2005 period (see figure 6 
above). Secondly, it could offer long-term produc-
tivity and economic resilience gains, if exposure 
to fossil fuels can be reduced and the productiv-
ity of green technologies improved. Thirdly, some 
form of debt sharing is likely to be more politically 
acceptable if it responds to the current logic of 
creating the long-term conditions for sustainable 
growth in troubled countries, and Europe more 
broadly, i.e. by leveraging investments in long-
term productive assets.    
3.2.2.1. Stimulating activity and restoring 
confidence in a large scale, high learning sector
The green sector is characterised by significant 
market failures and public good aspects. Invest-
ment is therefore below socially desirable levels, 
and government intervention can crowd-in, rather 
than out, private investment into new, efficient 
productive capital.10 This is especially so currently, 
with the EU economy well below equilibrium. In 
addition, green investments in Europe’s produc-
tive infrastructure are also likely to be suboptimal 
without intervention, due to their public good 
10. See e.g. Leiter et al. (2010) for an investigation 
of environmental regulation and investment into 
productive assets 
nature. Thus investments in the green sector could 
provide significant leverage effects and positive 
European spillovers. Investment in long-term 
productive infrastructures will create long-term 
sources of revenue attractive to private investors, 
provided that market failures and political risks 
can be adequately managed. These characteristics 
mean that investments could be leveraged with a 
minimum direct draw on public budgets. 
One should not be uncritical of the growth po-
tential of green investments. There will be a trade 
off between short- and long-term objectives. The 
current capital stock is designed for high carbon 
and resource consumption, and measures to re-
duce carbon and resource consumption could 
result in a less productive usage of this existing 
capital stock. Secondly, green technologies are 
currently not as productive as brown technologies, 
i.e. they are more capital and labour intensive than 
brown alternatives. 
This line of argument can be addressed in sev-
eral ways. Firstly, not all green policies would 
display inter-temporal trade-offs; some, such as 
energy efficiency, can involve significant win-
wins also in the short-term (Gillingham et al, 
2011). Secondly, the EU economy is currently far 
from equilibrium in any case.11 This means lower 
opportunity cost of investing now in green infra-
structures and technologies (Stern and Bowen, 
2010). Thirdly, the “brown” pathway of economic 
development is not without inter-temporal trade 
offs either, as it could engender risks of lock-in 
into long-term unproductive capital stocks and 
lock-out from future growth markets. Policy risks 
are therefore similarly pertinent to brown invest-
ments, resulting in investment delay (IEA, 2007). 
Fourthly, arbitrage between green and brown is 
not static and can be modified by policies to raise 
the relative productivity of green technologies. 
Fifth, other proposed structural reforms will also 
take years to boost activity in weaker Peripheral 
countries, and there are few other credible can-
didates for large-scale investment programs that 
also bring long-term productivity gains. Finally, 
any strategy to shift investment forward tempo-
rarily should be designed to create the long-term 
productive capital and skills to enable the repay-
ment of that investment. 
Thus while green investment can create em-
ployment and stimulate activity in the short 
term (see below), the main rationale may be 
the need to reinvest in European productive in-
frastructures, in order to increase productivity 
and resilience in the long-term (see below). 
11. As implied by the current high output gap of 1.6% of 
GDP.
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3.2.2.2. Employment  
The green sector may be characterised by a 
high initial labour intensity and a high share of 
domestic value added within the whole value 
added chain (Voituriez and Balmer, 2012). They 
may also be less tradable than in other indus-
tries. In the short-term, these characteristics can 
help create much needed employment, while 
in the longer-term improving the productivity 
of green technologies through learning effects. 
Experience with green stimulus shows that it can 
provide significant employment benefits, espe-
cially if complementary policies such as emissions 
pricing or RD&D is in place. For example, analysis 
of the green stimulus package in the US estimates 
that it created 720 000 jobs over the period 2009-
2012, 10% of the overall Recovery Act’s employ-
ment creation (Aldy, 2012). The impact would 
have likely been larger if complementary policies 
had been in place (Aldy, 2012).
3.2.2.3. Economic resilience 
Green investments can create the conditions 
for long-term prosperity. This will depend on a 
high degree of resource productivity. Indeed, we 
argued above that energy prices played a role 
in the current crises, and are now dragging on 
the recovery. In general, Peripheral countries 
are among the most exposed in the Eurozone to 
fossil fuel prices, due inter alia to their energy/
oil intensity and import dependency (ECB, 2010). 
Exposure to fossil fuel prices has a negative impact 
on growth, price stability and hence Eurozone 
monetary policy, and current account balance. A 
long-term strategy to put the European economy 
back on a sustainable footing should also consider 
energy and resource scarcity.
A number of studies have attempted to quan-
tify the hedge that climate/environmental policy 
provides against resource constraints, particu-
larly oil. Peersman and Van Robays (2011) show 
econometrically that countries that reduced their 
oil and energy dependency by improving efficien-
cy and diversifying the energy mix have reduced 
their exposure to oil shocks over the period 1970-
2010. Rozenberg et al (2010) show that global 
climate policy is a valuable hedge against the 
negative macroeconomic impacts of uncertain 
oil scarcity. Prospective modelling studies, such 
as JRC (2012) and Ecofys et al (2009), estimate 
that the EU’s 2020 climate policies will improve 
energy security and reduce exposure to oil price 
shocks. 
Green investments have the potential to 
stimulate innovation and advance the produc-
tivity frontier, as well as adapt the economy 
to systemic resource constraints, which are 
necessary to maintain prosperity on the long 
run by strengthening resilience. 
3.2.3. Conclusions and way forward 
Green investment could be a means to provide a 
short-term macroeconomic stimulus and inward 
investment in Peripheral countries, while creating 
the conditions for long-term economic resilience. 
There is a clear need for policy coordination, given 
the imbalance in capital availability between 
European countries. The political feasibility of 
this coordination may be higher in the case of 
green investment, since it lays foundations for 
sustainable economic prosperity rather than 
solely relaunching short- term demand. 
There are a number of policy proposals for 
leveraging green investment (e.g. green bonds). 
Further research could address the questions of 
modalities for designing such instruments (con-
ditionalities, issuance, project design and selec-
tion) and assessing their potential to stimulate 
productive employment and activity in troubled 
regions.
3.3. Stimulating green innovation
3.3.1. The rationale for and principles of 
innovation in the current context
Historically, innovation and technical progress 
have been associated with the high growth rates 
seen during the eighteenth century and nine-
teenth century industrial revolutions. During 
its nineteenth century industrial revolution, 
the UK focused its innovation, scientific expe-
rimentation and technology diffusion on a few 
high tech sectors (Landes, 1969). Thanks to 
technical progress, labour productivity grew at 
rate exceeding population growth and capital 
deterioration, thus allowing economic activity 
to bypass the law of decreasing marginal returns 
and Malthusian limits to growth (Solow, 1957). 
In that same period, the global balance of 
economic power was reshaped. In 1820, Asia ac-
counted for 55% of world GDP, a hundred years 
later only 20% (Maddison, 2002). Several politi-
cal, military and economic factors explain this 
trend. These included the adoption of techni-
cal progress as a motor of growth by western 
countries. The ability to drive and harness 
innovation has therefore been crucial in de-
termining economic progress and geopoliti-
cal power relations since the first industrial 
revolution.  
For economies near the productivity frontier, 
innovation may be the main source of wealth 
creation. This is in line with endogenous growth 
theory, which states that long-term growth is a 
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result of internal forces in the economy (Romer, 
1990). Among these forces, innovation ranks 
first. Aghion et al (2009) stresses that innova-
tion tomorrow depends on the portfolio of choic-
es open today. Hence, policy choices made today 
will define our future technological boundaries.
After the destruction of the Second World War, 
Western Europe had caught up with the world 
technology frontier in terms of per capita GDP and 
labour-capital ratio by the 1980s. As a result, it ex-
hausted capital accumulation and imitation as the 
main sources of growth (Aghion, 2006). However, 
since then Europe has not been significantly push-
ing forward the productivity frontier: since 1995, 
European productivity has declined relative to that 
of the US (World Bank, 2012). 
In order to reverse this trend, EU leaders placed 
innovation policy at the core of the 2000 Lisbon 
Strategy, whose goal was for Europe to “become 
the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world, capable of sustainable eco-
nomic growth with more and better jobs and greater 
social cohesion”. By 2010, academics and EU offi-
cials generally agreed that the strategy had failed 
to make Europe the most innovative region of the 
world. 
The inability of the EU to meet its Lisbon targets 
sheds light on the need to review its innovation 
policy framework. The World Bank (2012) offers a 
recent analysis of deficiencies therein. Europe’s in-
novation gap is due to a complex array of causes, 
notably barriers to entry, capital market failures, 
fragmentation of the internal market, etc. Inno-
vation in the EU too compartmentalized among 
countries and disciplines. The Innovation Union 
report shows that 85% of public research is pro-
grammed, financed, monitored and evaluated at 
the national level (EC, 2011h). Less than 6 % of 
total public R&D investment is done in a collabora-
tive, transnational approach. Just 11% of energy-
related R&D investment, public and private, is in-
vested at the European level (JRC, 2009). In terms 
of interdisciplinary integration and achieving EU 
economies of scale, the EU still has substantial ef-
forts to make.  
Diffusion of research and innovation is also a 
weak link for the EU. While Europe is among top 
players in terms of knowledge production (29% of 
world production of peer-reviewed publications 
versus 22% for the USA and 17% for China), it is 
loosing ground as regards to exploitation of their 
results: the rate of growth in the number of PCT12 
patent applications over recent years in Japan and 
South Korea is double that of the EU (EC, 2011h). 
12. Patent corporation treaty.  
These deficiencies will not be addressed sole-
ly by a focus on the green sector: policy effort 
is clearly necessary to address Europe’s overall 
innovation system. Nonetheless, there may be 
reasons for placing a special focus on the green 
sector, as we argue below.
3.3.2. The opportunity for and potential of 
green innovation
Firstly, a range of barriers to entry, public good 
effects and market failures characterize this sector. 
These include environmental damage externali-
ties; knowledge spillovers; information asymme-
tries and coordination externalities. Significant 
economies of scale and initial productivity advan-
tages mean that laissez faire innovation may be 
biased towards incumbent (dirty) technologies, 
leading to a socially suboptimal development of 
new (clean) technologies (Acemoglu et al, 2009; 
Unruh, 2002). Finally, clean technology innova-
tions may provide significant public good contri-
butions, such as climate change mitigation and 
resource security. These factors suggest that social 
returns to clean technology innovation could be 
high, particularly in the long-term. 
3.3.2.1. Competitiveness 
Secondly, it is posited that clean technology inno-
vation could provide a source of competitive advan-
tage; firstly, as it enables more efficient production 
with increasingly scarce resources; and secondly, 
as a sector itself with large growth prospects inter-
nationally (Bleischwitz, 2010). A large body of 
research has investigated a posited connection 
between environmental regulation, innovation and 
competitiveness (Porter Hypothesis, PH). The PH 
is generally divided into strong and weak variants:
 m environmental regulation can increase environ-
mental innovation (weak PH); 
 m and in turn increase the competitiveness of 
firms or countries in the green sector (strong 
sectoral PH). 
 m sector specific innovation can spill over into 
other sectors of the economy, increasing the 
overall economic competitiveness of the econo-
my (strong economy-wide PH). 
Well-designed policy mechanisms can indeed 
contribute to increased sectoral innovation (EEA, 
2011). The nature of the environmental problem, 
the sector involved, and the regulatory tools cho-
sen are important contextual conditions, but 
well-designed policy, combining push-pull inter-
ventions, does seem to be able to stimulate envi-
ronmental innovation. This finding appears par-
ticularly robust for the energy sector (Costantini 
and Crespi, 2008; Johnstone et al, 2010).
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The strong PH is more complex. It likely involves 
a trade off between dirty and clean sectors, and in-
teractions with existing factors of comparative ad-
vantage. Above, in Section 3.1.3.3., we addressed 
the question of negative competitiveness impacts 
of environmental regulation. Here we survey the 
literature on the strong PH.   
There have been a small number of econometric 
studies of the relationship between environmental 
regulation and EU export performance, either in 
green technologies or more broadly (see Huberty 
and Zachmann, 2011; Costantini and Crespi, 2008; 
and Costantini and Mazzantini, 2012). These find, 
firstly, that environmental regulation can increase 
export competitiveness in the green sector. Exist-
ing innovative and technological capabilities are 
a key co-determinant of export competitiveness 
in the green sector. Countries/firms already spe-
cializing in similar sectors will perform better in 
terms of green exports. Recently, Costantini and 
Mazzantini (2012) find that environmental regu-
lation is associated with increased general export 
competitiveness, specifically in the high-tech and 
medium/low-technology sectors. 
3.3.2.2. Economic resilience 
We argued above that the world was entering into 
a period of resource scarcity, driven by booming 
demand and the growing marginal cost of resource 
extraction (McKinsey, 2011). In this context, firms 
and industries producing resource efficient goods 
may gain a competitive advantage. For example, 
Hamilton (2009) and Edelstein and Kilian (2009) 
argue that the decline of the US auto-sector during 
the 2007/8 oil price boom was in part due to the 
fuel inefficiency of its products relative to those of 
international competitors. In addition, innovation 
is essential for decoupling economic prosperity 
from resource inputs and environmental impacts.  
This line of argument is developed in the theo-
retical framework of Acemoglu et al (2009). Under 
resource constraints, the long-term prosperity of 
an economy is shaped by:
 m The exhaustibility of dirty production factors. 
 m The (dynamic) elasticity of substitution between 
dirty/clean production methods. 
 m The ability of environmental innovation to 
enhance 2) in order to avoid productivity 
constraints arising from 1).      
 
In a context of low short-term substitutability 
of production methods and resource limitations 
to dirty production (e.g. exhaustible fossil fuels, 
significant environmental damages), directed en-
vironmental innovation is essential to maintain 
long-term prosperity. Hourcade et al (2011) show 
that with more pessimistic (realistic) parameters 
for the substitutability of clean/dirty production 
and the stringency of environmental constraints, 
innovation and pricing policies become even more 
central to maintaining prosperity in the mid- to 
long-term. 
Thus environmental innovation should be 
seen as a key part of a long-term strategy to 
maintain prosperity and competitiveness in an 
increasingly resource-scarce world (Quitzow, 
2011; Bleischwitz, 2010). However, inertia and 
path-dependency in the development of clean 
technologies necessitates immediate policy 
intervention. 
3.3.2.3. Reducing inequalities    
According to Blanchard and Cohen (2009), the 
relative and absolute decrease of low skilled 
workers’ wages over the past 25 years in the US is 
due to innovation, regulation and trade dynamics. 
This argument is further detailed in Brauer and 
Hickok (1994) who show that productivity gains 
and trade induced structural changes weighed 
more on less educated, low-skilled workers.  
Interestingly, recent studies (Voituriez and 
Balmer, 2012) report that investments in green 
technologies have the prospect of being beneficial 
for both high and low skilled workers. Jobs created 
by green technologies are to a certain extent non-
tradable and range in all types of activities: from 
technology design to production, to installation 
and maintenance. Green innovation itself cannot 
address wage and employment inequalities, but its 
integration within an intelligent regulatory frame-
work can.
The economic transformation envisaged by the 
green economy must thus be accompanied by a 
larger set of policies. The shift to a green econo-
my will require professionals capable of moving 
at the interface of different disciplines and utiliz-
ing cross-disciplinary innovation. In that respect, 
pan-European, multidisciplinary educational pro-
grammes are short of funding, teachers and infra-
structure. Projected demand for skilled workers in 
green economy sectors exceeds BAU supply (EC, 
2011h).
3.3.3 Conclusions and way forward  
Fostering environmental innovation should be 
part of a long-term macroeconomic strategy for 
Europe. First, it is a necessary (though not suffi-
cient) step to achieve the ecological transition: by 
lowering its cost it will facilitate the shift towards 
a resilient economy. Second, by developing new 
products and services, environmental innovation 
can be a source of non-price competitiveness, 
particularly in the longer-term. EU trade partners 
are growingly investing in green technologies, 
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making it even more essential to develop innova-
tive green industries in the EU. 
Getting the right EU wide policy framework to 
develop and diffuse innovation is crucial. Cur-
rently at the European level, resources are too low 
and too fragmented. Policy instruments to support 
innovation can be improved in three ways: by di-
recting environmental innovation (reorganization 
the institutional framework, subsidizing), facilitat-
ing access to markets (feed in tariffs) and modi-
fying existing markets (via implicit/explicit price 
mechanisms and market segmentation through 
information and labels). These three dimensions 
need further harmonization and funding at the 
European level. 
coNclusioN
Since January 2012, the tension in sovereign bond 
markets has calmed somewhat, and progress has 
been made on reforms to fiscal and economic 
governance. This buys some breathing space for 
reflection on the longer-term economic strategy 
of the EU, and whether the short-term response to 
the crises can be brought in line with that strategy.
The EU crises are taking place within a con-
text of rapid and profound global change. Two 
megatrends in particular stand out: growing pres-
sure on resources, and climate change.  
In the long-term, the transition to a green econ-
omy is essential, in order to maintain the environ-
mental conditions for prosperity, and a competitive 
economy within those constraints. Resource and 
environmental constraints are already a challenge 
and an opportunity. The dramatic pre-crises rise in 
commodity prices, particularly oil, played a con-
tributing role in fuelling and triggering the crises.
In the long-term, therefore, the benefits of mov-
ing to a green economy will be increased econom-
ic resilience, innovation, and competitiveness, as 
well as the preservation of environmental assets. 
In the short-term, there can also be potential to 
create synergies between the crises response and 
the shift to the green economy. Two particularly 
promising opportunities are environmental fiscal 
reforms and green investments. If integrated with-
in broader fiscal reform, the latter can contribute 
to a sustainable and fairer fiscal consolidation, 
while creating significant employment. Green 
investments have the potential to create employ-
ment and activity in the short-term, while pushing 
forward the technology frontier in key green sec-
tors. This is consistent with the current focus of the 
crises response, namely placing the EU economy 
back on a sustainable path. ❚
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